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Abstract:  The five modes are a list of tools used by ancient 
sceptics to guide dogmatic people towards suspending their 
judgement. Attributed to Agrippa (of uncertain date) and used 
extensively by Sextus Empiricus (2nd or 3rd century CE), these 
modes are still widely discussed today by epistemologists and 
specialists in ancient philosophy. Scholars disagree, however, on 
how to understand the way the five modes are used together and 
what the logical form of the sceptical strategy behind their 
deployment is. This paper offers a reconstruction of the system of 
the five modes that avoids these problems. In specific, unlike 
previous reconstructions, (a) it includes a non-trivial version of the 
mode of relativity, (b) avoids committing the sceptic to a normative 
principle and (c) follows the textual evidence more closely. 
Moreover, I argue that the system can be better understood as a 
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list of steps in a process, whose underlying logic can be expressed 
by a single algorithm.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The five modes –the mode of disagreement, regress, 
relativity, hypothesis, and reciprocity– are a list of tools used 
by ancient sceptics to guide dogmatic people towards 
suspending their judgement.1 Attributed to Agrippa (of 
uncertain date) and used extensively by Sextus Empiricus 
(2nd or 3rd century CE), these modes are still widely 
discussed today by epistemologists and specialists in ancient 
philosophy. Scholars disagree, however, on how to 
understand the way the five modes are used together and 
what the logical form of the sceptical strategy behind their 
deployment is. Reconstructions run the risk of 
oversimplifying, misconstruing or weakening the sceptical 
challenge posed by the five modes.  
This paper offers a reconstruction of the system of the 
five modes for the suspension of judgement that aims to 
avoid these problems. In specific, unlike previous 
reconstructions, (a) it includes a non-trivial version of the 
mode of relativity, (b) avoids committing the sceptic to a 
normative principle and (c) follows the textual evidence 
more closely. The paper has three sections. Firstly, I show 
that previous reconstructions are unable to express 
important features of the workings of the system. Secondly, 
I revise the sources, show that it is problematic to mix and 
match the two surviving versions of the modes and assess 
how much evidence of systematic use of the modes we have. 
                                                        
1 For the description of each of these modes see section 2, below. 
For the notion of ‘sceptical mode’ in general, see Sextus Empiricus’ 
Outlines of Scepticism [abbreviated hereafter as PH] 1, 31-35.  
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Finally, I propose a new reconstruction of the system. I argue 
that the system can be better understood as a list of steps in 
a process, whose underlying logic can be expressed by a 
single algorithm. 
 
 
1. CURRENT PROPOSALS TO RECONSTRUCT THE 
SYSTEM OF THE FIVE MODES 
 
How should we understand the five modes for the 
suspension of judgement? Many people agree that they are 
meant to work as a dialectical system.2 However, the textual 
evidence of how these modes may fit together is, at best, 
scarce and insufficient. Barnes (1990a, 1990b), for example, 
offers a couple of basic diagrams that are meant to capture 
the systematic aspect of the modes, but he admits that they 
are inventions with no historical actuality (1990b, 215). 
Recent scholars are often too ready to attribute specific 
logical structures to the system, implied within the 
description and use of the five modes, but they rarely agree 
on how exactly that structure should look. 
Moreover, one may wonder if there really is a specific, 
organized way in which the modes work together in any 
conversation. Perhaps the sceptic will use them at her 
discretion, deciding which one to use depending on the 
circumstances; or maybe she can use them randomly, 
without a specific order and not having to follow a specific 
set of rules. If one of the latter alternatives is compatible with 
the textual evidence, does it mean that the traditional 
                                                        
2 See, for example, Bailey (1990), Barnes (1990b, 1990a), Fogelin 
(1994a), Pritchard (2000, 190), Striker (2001), Hankinson (1995, 
163), Bett (2005), and Machuca (2011). 
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depiction of the system speculates way beyond what is 
needed to make sense of the texts? 
Even beyond a purely historical concern, there is another 
more troubling problem. Williams (1988, 556), for example, 
once thought that ‘Pyrrhonian scepticism cannot be 
systematised, formalized, or reduced to a rule;’ not, at least, 
without seriously misinterpreting the texts and 
compromising its coherence. Or take Barnes (1990b, 114) 
again, who claims that the system of five modes, if there is 
such a thing, ‘is a curious thing: it is positively rococo in its 
complexity, yet it possesses neither aesthetic elegance nor 
philosophical cohesion.’ So, even if the text clearly showed 
the modes working together in a specific way, it is unclear if 
it is possible to construe that into a formal schema and how 
exactly one ought to understand its logical form and whether 
its schematization would fit together with the sceptical 
project more generally. 
These difficulties, of course, have not stopped some 
people from trying such reconstructions. There are two main 
families of proposals in the literature: those who divide the 
modes into a triggering strategy and a sceptical argument, 
and those who argue that the five modes are a single 
dialectical strategy or technique. However, as I shall show, it 
is unclear whether the models offered by both of these 
families of proposals really escape from speculating, 
misreading the text, or compromising the coherence of the 
sceptical project. 
 
 
1.1 The five modes as a triggering strategy plus sceptical arguments 
 
Take for instance the first family of proposals, popular 
with many contemporary epistemologists. The idea is to 
reduce the five modes into a triggering strategy that is 
sometimes obviated, and an argument, normally a trilemma 
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(the famous ‘Agrippa’s trilemma’).3 The appeal in these 
attempts is clear. They try to offer a neat, manageable and 
elegant interpretation of the modes. There are many 
variations of the trilemma, but it can be illustrated as follows 
(this is my own version). Imagine you have been challenged 
to justify one of your claims, and after you offer an answer 
your interlocutor presents you with the following argument: 
 
Agrippa’s trilemma (AT) 
 
1. The justification for your claim is either an 
unjustified hypothesis, or requires in turn a chain 
of justification that falls into an infinite regress, or 
is circular. 
2. If it is an unjustified hypothesis, you should 
suspend judgement. 
3. If your justification falls into an infinite regress, 
you should suspend judgement. 
4. If it is circular, you should suspend judgement. 
5. Therefore, you should suspend judgement (from 1-
4). 
 
This is as good as one could hope for a philosophical 
argument. It is valid, its premises are plausible, and its 
conclusion shocking. However, this type of formalization of 
the modes has received heavy criticism, some of which is 
undeserved. A common complaint is that it makes the 
sceptic endorse the premises of her argument. But that does 
                                                        
3 See, for example, Greco (2006, 9) and Turri (2012). Brennan and 
Lee (2014, 257–58) have recently offered a version of the argument 
as a tertalemma, including the relativity mode, traditionally ignored 
or understood as part of the triggering strategy. I shall come back 
to the inclusion of relativity later. 
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not necessarily follow. Anyone can offer an argument 
without committing to its validity or the truth of its premises, 
in a dialectical interchange what really matters is if one’s 
interlocutor accepts the argument’s premises. A similar but 
distinct complaint is that the sceptic would not be able to 
apply this argument in herself, because in order for it to work 
one needs to accept dogmatically its premises and rule of 
inference. However, this might not be a problem either. An 
urbane reading of Pyrrhonian scepticism would not be 
affected (since it means that the sceptic does not suspend 
judgement about everything), and a rustic interpretation 
could understand the modes as just one step into a longer 
path to a global scepticism.4 
However, one may worry that this formalization leads to 
another problem. The argument seems to allow easy 
responses, since people could just reject one of its premises. 
In fact, this is the reason some epistemologists like this type 
of argument so much. It provides the background for 
introducing foundationalism, infinitism, and coherentism.5 
However, things are not as easy as they seem. Whatever one 
answers to the above argument, the sceptic can reapply it 
directed to one’s new claim since the five modes are topic-
neutral. Thus, even in this reconstruction, the five modes do 
not necessarily compromise the coherence of scepticism and 
pose an interesting meta-epistemological challenge.6 
However, this reconstruction does a poor job of 
expressing the dialectical context in which the argument is 
                                                        
4 For the distinction between urban and rustic scepticism, see 
Galen, diff. puls. 7.711K, praenot 14.628K. The labels were 
popularized in the contemporary literature by Barnes (1982). 
5 See, for example, Klein (2003) and Pritchard (2006, chap. 4). 
6 For recent discussion on Agrippa’s trilemma see, for example, 
Gerken (2012), Wright (2013) and Williams (2015) 
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supposed to be offered. Leaving the dialectical aspect 
implied is the main reason people accuse the sceptics of 
dogmatism. To avoid this problem, Lammenranta (2008, 8) 
supplies Agrippa’s trilemma with a formalization of the 
disagreement mode, which he thinks is the central feature of 
the system and the mode that clarifies its dialectical nature. 
For his reconstruction, he asks us to suppose a question to 
which there are only two possible answers (p and not-p), he 
then offers an argument with the following form:7 
 
Disagreement argument (DA) 
 
1. S1 claims that p. 
2. S2 claims that not-p. 
3. At most, one of them is right. 
4. The disagreement between S1 and S2 is 
irresolvable. 
5. We should suspend judgement about p. 
 
If one denies premise (4), Lammenranta argues, the 
sceptic would ask how the disagreement is to be resolved. If 
one gives a reason r for p, the sceptic points out that there is 
also an irresolvable disagreement about that too. If we keep 
rejecting premise (4), the sceptic could repeat the 
disagreement mode over and over or introduce Agrippa’s 
trilemma. If we put both of these arguments together, we get 
a challenge with four out of the five modes. 
Now, Lammenranta explains that the dialectical strategy 
of his disagreement argument is based on the normative 
principle that under irresolvable disagreement we should 
                                                        
7 In Lammenranta’s original version he talks about beliefs, but I 
think it is more accurate to talk about claims in a dialectical 
interchange. 
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suspend judgement. But notice that this also applies to 
Agrippa’s trilemma. Thus, a full reconstruction in these 
terms would include one normative principle (NP) and two 
arguments (DA and AT). The principle can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
NP: If a judgement about whether p or not-p 
is under irresolvable disagreement, or is 
grounded on an unjustified hypothesis, infinite 
regress, or circular reasoning, we should suspend 
judgement. 
 
However, in this reconstruction, the sceptic is vulnerable 
to a simple objection. As Lammenranta notices, it is possible 
to avoid scepticism by rejecting the normative principle.8 
This move comes with the price of breaking the link between 
claiming something and the requirement to offer some 
justification for it. However, some people would bite the 
bullet and acknowledge that the scope of the modes is 
restricted to people who are in the business of justifying their 
claims. Yet, the reconstruction might not really require a 
normative principle. I shall come back to this point later, but 
the attempt to reduce the five modes to a couple of 
arguments faces another problem. Reconstructions like the 
above are inventions based rather loosely on the original 
sources. Thus, one may be unsatisfied with them as historical 
reconstructions. Therefore, if this proposal fails on both 
fronts, as a historically accurate interpretation and as a strong 
and challenging formalization of the modes, it loses some of 
its original appeal.  
 
 
                                                        
8 See also Perin (2010) and Fogelin (1994, 114-116). 
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1.2 The five modes as a single dialectical strategy  
 
The second proposal has given rise to many variants but 
they all understand the modes as challenges in a dialectical 
exchange coordinated in a single strategy.9 This makes 
clearer that the sceptics do not offer proof, nor are they 
committed to any premise or rule of inference. Even if this 
proposal may be closer to the original texts, people often 
speculate over the exact way the dialectical strategy works. 
As with the previous proposal, they also rely on a normative 
principle and some models incorporate only four of the five 
modes.  
Barnes’ (1990b, 114–15) system, for example, offers a 
reconstruction with four of the five modes, leaving aside 
relativity. He starts with disagreement about a problem, and 
then shows that to resolve it we can just affirm one of the 
solutions, or offer some reasons to support it. If we chose 
the first one, the sceptic would reply with the hypothetical 
mode. Thus, it seems that we must choose the second option 
and offer some reasons to support our solution to the 
problem. But the sceptic will adduce disagreement about 
these reasons and we cannot just affirm them because of the 
hypothetical mode. Therefore, we produce some reasons in 
favour of our initial reasons. However this new set of reasons 
is either identical to the previous one, in which case the 
sceptic will use the reciprocity mode, or is new, in which case 
it will be subject to disagreement again. In this way, by 
repeated application of disagreement, hypothesis and 
                                                        
9 Compare, for example, my the proposal in Vázquez (2009), 
Thorsrud (2009, 147–60), Machuca (2011), Brennan & Lee (2014) 
and Bullock (2016). 
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reciprocity, we are led into an infinite regression, which is 
forbidden by the mode of regress.10 
Hankinson (1995, 171) thinks that the texts ‘clearly 
indicate that the [five] Modes form a coherent collective 
sceptical strategy’, and offers a similar version of the sceptical 
system. According to him, if we suppose a claim C1, there 
will be disagreement as to whether it should be accepted on 
its own terms or whether it needs further confirmation. Such 
a disagreement can either be decided or not. If not, we 
should suspend judgement. If the disagreement is decidable, 
it is decidable on the basis of another claim C2, or it is just 
assumed to be true. If the latter, then the mode of hypothesis 
applies. If the former is the case, C2 is either supported by 
another claim C3 or by C1. If it is by C1, then the reciprocal 
mode applies. If it is supported by C3, the previous steps will 
repeat, leading either to suspension of judgement or to 
infinite regress.11 
Fogelin (1994b, 116), put forward another influential 
variation. He divides the five modes into two subsets, what 
he calls the challenging modes (disagreement and relativity), 
in charge of triggering a demand for justification, and the 
dialectical modes (hypothesis, regress, and circularity), which 
shows that justification is impossible. In his reconstruction, 
the target of the five modes is someone committed to the 
possibility of knowledge and a strong normative principle 
according to which it is epistemologically irresponsible to 
choose without an argument between competing claims.12 
                                                        
10 Later, Barnes (1990b, 116–20) offers two more models; one 
using the two modes (PH 1, 178-179) to deploy disagreement, 
regress and circularity, and another with three modes (hypothesis, 
reciprocity and regress). 
11 See also Woodruff (2010, 226). 
12 See also Williams (2004, 121–22) and Thorsrud (2009, 151). 
Similarly, Hankinson (1995, 163) divides them into ‘material’ and 
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I suggested a different model in Vázquez (2009, 46–49, 
52). There, I argue that all the modes are questions or 
challenges that can start the dialectic, and each mode can lead 
to suspension or, if rejected, to any other mode. In this 
proposal, the suspension of judgement is not only the final 
outcome of the five modes but also the ‘the dynamic process 
of going from one mode to another in a permanent 
movement of thoughts’ (52). The suspension, then, does not 
have to be a passive final state, but an active and continuous 
dialectic.13 
 How exactly shall we represent the logic behind these 
reconstructions? They have sometimes been visualised in 
tree-like schemas but their format varies and their structure 
is not always transparent. However, these models can be 
understood as a sequence of steps used by the sceptic. This 
can be represented in flowcharts, which show the differences 
between the models offered above more clearly. Take for 
instance Barnes’ and Hankinson’s models (figure 1 and 2 
below). 
                                                        
‘formal’ modes, and seems to agree that this is a helpful distinction, 
but not necessarily that it is the way they are used by the sceptic. 
13 For a similar proposal see Bullock (2016). 
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Figure 1: Barnes’ model 
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Figure 2: Hankinson’s model 
 
The flowcharts show the different structures of these 
models and their differences in terms of specificity and 
detail. Note, for example, that Barnes’ model is more 
explicitly dialectical. Hankinson’s model, however, can be 
applied not only in a conversation with the dogmatist but 
also in the sceptic’s internal dialogue. In both models, there 
is a point where the steps have to be repeated. Their 
proposed structure, however, expresses this important 
aspect rather poorly. Hankinson’s model would grow 
indefinitely and trivially, whereas Barnes’ heavily relies on the 
reapplication of disagreement (and if that is all one needs, 
the other modes seem pointless). 
None of these models, however, offer all of the 
advantages while avoiding all of the problems. The details of 
how each mode connects with the others and which one 
should be reapplied are highly speculative (their authors 
offer no reason to prefer one model over the other nor do 
they offer any specific textual evidence for the specifics of 
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their reconstructions). Moreover, most of these models are 
incomplete or curtail the scope of the system’s application 
by assuming that the sceptic is committed to a normative 
principle. But again, there is no textual basis for that nor does 
it seem a logical requirement. Sextus never presents 
suspension of judgement as something the sceptic should do, 
but as something that happens to her, that is brought about 
by the modes where the sceptic has no say (see PH 1, 35, 
177).14 In the next section, I turn to the original textual 
evidence to reassess the situation and to show that there is 
still room for improvement in our characterisation of the 
system of the five modes. 
 
 
2. THE TEXTUAL EVIDENCE 
  
There are only two surviving sources for the five modes 
for the suspension of judgement. One is Sextus Empiricus’ 
PH 1, 164-169 and the other is a parallel passage in Diogenes 
Laertius’ Lives 9, 88-89.15 In addition, Sextus deploys the 
modes in numerous places, most notoriously in PH 1, 170-
177, 178-179, 185-186 and 2, 20. Although Diogenes’ 
passage is briefer, it offers variations and information 
                                                        
14 This aspect of Pyrrhonian scepticism has been noted by various 
scholars but few reconstructions of the system of the five modes 
take notice.   
15 There are some antecedents to the five modes, most clearly in 
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics A 3. See Long (1981) and Barnes 
(1975, 103–4, 1987, 1990b, 120–21). Some modes may be traced 
back to Plato’s Teaeteetus (152d–e), Lysis (219c8-10) and Euthydemus. 
However, I leave the discussion about the origins of each of the 
five modes for another time, and focus on their form as preserved 
in Diogenes Laertius and Sextus. 
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missing in Sextus, like attributing the modes to Agrippa.16 A 
plausible explanation for the similarities in Sextus and 
Diogenes is that both were copying from a common source 
now lost. However, the authorship of this common source 
is very difficult to establish.17 The parallel texts read as 
follows: 
 
 
Sextus Empiricus  Diogenes Laertius 
 
[164] The more recent 
Sceptics offer the 
following five modes of 
suspension of judgement: 
first, the mode deriving 
from dispute; second, the 
mode throwing one back 
[88] […] But those in 
Agrippa’s circle posit 
another Five Modes: one 
that argues from 
Disagreement, one from 
Infinite Regress, one from 
Relativity, one from 
                                                        
16 This is a sceptic of whom we know nothing else. Strictly 
speaking, though, the phrase Οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀγρίππαν in DL 9, 88 is 
ambiguous between Agrippa, Agrippa and his associates, or 
Agrippa’s followers. See Barnes (1990a, 4266). See also Barnes 
(1990b, viii). Sextus, in contrast, only reports that the five modes 
were introduced after Aenesidemus. See PH 1, 36 and 164. 
17 For the hypothesis of the common source and its possible 
authorship, see Barnes (1992), who ends up unpersuaded by any 
of the possible options, but finds the idea that it could have been 
Agrippa himself attractive. Janáček (1970), however, thinks that 
Diogenes is a more faithful copyist of the original source. For the 
discussion see Barnes (1992, 4268–73). I think that another 
plausible option is that Diogenes is copying from an earlier source, 
probably Agrippa, and that Sextus has access to a modified and 
more dialectical version of the five modes, unless the ‘more recent 
sceptics’ is a veiled reference to himself and his own philosophical 
school. 
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ad infinitum; third, the 
mode deriving from 
relativity; fourth, the 
hypothetical mode; fifth, 
the reciprocal mode. 
 
[165] According to the 
mode deriving from 
disagreement, we discover 
that undecided dissension 
about the matter proposed 
has come about both in 
ordinary life and among 
philosophers. Because of 
this we are not able either 
to choose or to reject 
anything, and we end up 
with suspension of 
judgement. 
 
[166] In the mode deriving 
from infinite regress, we 
say that what is brought 
forward as a source of 
conviction for the matter 
proposed itself needs 
another such source, 
which itself needs another, 
and so ad infinitum, so that 
we have no point from 
which to begin to establish 
anything, and suspension 
of judgement follows. 
 
Hypothesis, and one from 
Reciprocity. 
 
 
 
 
The mode from 
Disagreement exposes any 
question put forward 
among philosophers or in 
ordinary life as full of 
utmost conflict and 
complete confusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mode from Infinite 
Regress does not permit 
that which is under 
investigation to be 
established, because one 
thing receives its credibility 
from another and so on ad 
infinitum. 
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[167] In the mode deriving 
from relativity, as we said 
above, the existing object 
appears to be such-and-
such relative to the subject 
judging and to the things 
observed together with it, 
but we suspend judgement 
on what it is like in its 
nature. 
 
[168] We have the mode 
from hypothesis when the 
Dogmatists, being thrown 
back ad infinitum, begin 
from something which 
they do not establish but 
claim to assume simply 
and without proof in 
virtue of a concession. 
 
 
 
[169] The reciprocal mode 
occurs when what ought 
to be confirmatory of the 
object under investigation 
needs to be made 
convincing by the object 
under investigation; then, 
being unable to take either 
in order to establish the 
other, we suspend 
[89] The mode from 
Relativity says that nothing 
is apprehended by itself, 
but always with something 
else. Therefore, it declares 
these matters unknown. 
 
 
 
 
 
The mode from 
Hypothesis is introduced in 
response to those who 
believe that one should 
take as trustworthy the 
starting-points of things 
straightaway, rather than 
put them into question. 
But this is pointless: 
someone else will set up 
the opposite hypothesis. 
 
The mode from 
Reciprocity comes up 
when that which should 
confirm the matter under 
investigation is itself in 
need of being confirmed 
by the very thing that is 
investigated, as when 
someone, seeking to 
confirm that there are 
pores by appealing to the 
occurrence of emanations, 
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judgement about both (PH 
1, 164-169).18 
might adduce pores as 
confirmatory of there 
being emanations (DL 9, 
88-89).19 
 
There are some important differences between Sextus’ 
and Diogenes’ version of the five modes.20 Diogenes makes 
no reference to the suspension of judgement, gives no 
indication whatsoever that the modes are used together in a 
systematic way, and seems to conceive the modes as 
arguments that prove, establish conclusions, and reject other 
people’s arguments. Strictly speaking, then, Diogenes’ 
version of the five modes does not argue for scepticism but 
for negative metadogmatism.21 If there is a systematic and 
more dialectical use of the modes, whatever that is, it is only 
present in Sextus’ report, and it could have been a later 
development not originally present in Agrippa’s version. In 
Sextus’ report, the suspension of judgement plays a central 
role and is mentioned five times. The text also hints at some 
connections between the modes and is careful not to say that 
they prove or imply accepting any claim or rule of inference. 
There is no normative language. The modes are treated as 
strategies that lead to the suspension of judgement and fit 
with Sextus’ general sceptical agenda. 
                                                        
18 All Sextus’ transl. by Annas & Barnes (2000), with minor 
modifications. 
19 Transl. by Scharffenberger & Vogt (2015). 
20 For a detailed comparison and discussion, see Barnes (1992, 
4263–73, 1987, 1990a) and Janáček (1970, 1972). 
21 Barnes (1992, 4254) defines a metadogmatist as ‘someone who 
holds views about the cognitive status of certain propositions – 
that we do or do not, can or cannot, know or believe that certain 
things are thus and so.’ 
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Finally, it seems that Diogenes used Peripatetic 
terminology whereas Sextus used a Stoic one.22 These 
terminological differences suggest that even if Diogenes and 
Sextus used a common source, their reports belong to two 
very different interpretative traditions. This makes very risky 
to mix and match modes from both lists. 
The report of the mode of disagreement is also strikingly 
different. Diogenes’ version of disagreement only gives the 
conclusion of what the mode is supposed to prove: that any 
inquiry sets out an extremely negative outcome at a 
psychologically and interpersonal level. It is difficult to infer 
the rest of the argument, but the result of this mode, if 
successful, is a claim about the nature of inquiry: that 
regardless of its content, it leads to conflict and distress. The 
mode promises an astonishing result since it turns the inquiry 
into a forbidden zone. The text, however, fails to tell us how 
that outcome is achieved. The mere fact of disagreement, 
even if pervasive, is not enough to produce the level of 
contention and disturbance promised by the version of the 
mode reported by Diogenes.  
In Sextus, however, the mode from disagreement has a 
different form. It is, strictly speaking, the mode resulting 
from undecided disagreement.23 A plain disagreement will not 
necessarily produce distress, a heated dispute, or suspension 
of judgement. In fact, Sextus’ version does not even assume 
that undecided disagreement produces the negative effects 
advertised in Diogenes’ version. In Sextus, this mode only 
                                                        
22 See Barnes (1987) and Mansfeld (1988). 
23 Note that in PH 1, 165, δι' ἣν refers to ἀνεπίκριτον στάσιν. What 
causes the suspension of judgement is the fact that the 
disagreement is undecided. For the decision to translate 
ἀνεπίκριτος as ‘undecided’ instead of ‘undecidable,’ see Barnes 
(1990b, 16–20). See also Machuca (2011). 
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leads to suspension if the person discovers (εὑρίσκομεν) that, 
under the current circumstances, there is an undecided 
dispute. 
Furthermore, disagreement in Sextus seems to 
presuppose a previous interchange or awareness of 
arguments or evidence for and against the topic of 
discussion. The recognition of a specific undecided 
disagreement seems to depend on whether there are (or seem 
to be) opposing irreconcilable views about a given topic 
already mentioned. One may object, following Barnes 
(1990b, 21), that undecided disagreement does not produce 
suspension of belief. Barnes suggests that we are supposed 
to read Sextus’ ‘we are not able to choose or to rule out 
anything’ as ‘we should not choose or rule out anything.’ If this 
were correct, the sceptic would be clearly committed to a 
normative principle. But that is not in the text. 
The result can be read, instead, as a report of an 
appearance. Given the sceptic’s appearance that the dispute 
is undecided at a specific moment and place, she reports that 
she is unable to choose. When the sceptic says that she is not 
able to choose, she is being literal about it. She is reporting 
his inability to take a decision, and for that she needs no 
normative principle. If she were able to choose, then the 
dispute would obviously be decidable. Suspension of 
judgement may not necessarily follow in every case and for 
everybody, though. The sceptic is only reporting that it does 
sometimes happen, to some people. The reasons are not 
said. The sceptic makes no claims about them. 
The passages also report two different versions of the 
mode from relativity. In Diogenes, relativity looks like an 
abbreviated version of the sixth mode of Aenesidemus (PH 
1, 24; DL 9, 84-85)24 or a variation of one of the two modes, 
                                                        
24 This has been already suggested by Vogt (2015, 63). 
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a list reported by Sextus but absent from Diogenes (PH 1, 
178). In contrast, Sextus’ version of the relativity mode refers 
back to Sextus’ version of the eighth mode of Aenesidemus 
(PH 1, 135-136), which is different from the eighth mode 
reported by Diogenes (DL 9, 86) and seems to be a later 
invention.25 The modifications found in Sextus aim to 
improve the cohesion of the sceptic’s modes. 
However, in both of its versions, this mode might be 
deemed problematic. The main worry is that it is dogmatic, 
superfluous, or fails to integrate with the other four.26 
Brennan & Lee (2014) use Diogenes Laertius’ version of the 
relativity mode in an attempt to incorporate it into the 
system. However, if Brennan and Lee (2014, 251) accuse 
Sextus’ version of relativity of not adding anything to the 
system of the five modes not already secured by 
disagreement, Diogenes’ version can be accused of not 
adding anything not already secured by the hypothetical 
mode, even if it targets a distinct relation, as Brennan and 
Lee suggest. 
Moreover, as I have shown, it is unwise to mix the 
information from our two surviving sources because they 
seem to belong to different stages of the development of the 
five modes and to two different interpretative traditions. 
Otherwise, in the hope of finding Agrippa’s original system 
of the five modes, we run the risk of unintentionally 
ascribing to him a mere invention that has insufficient 
historical grounds. Therefore, it is best to look at Sextus’ 
                                                        
25 See Annas & Barnes (1985, 142–43) and Barnes (1992, 4274–
75). 
26 See Annas & Barnes (1985, 97–98, 144–45), Barnes (1990b, 113), 
Hankinson (1995, 163, 166), Woodruff (2010, 224), and Bett 
(2010). 
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report alone, which is the only source that offers some hints 
of a systematic use of the modes. 
Looking at the evidence it is also necessary to specify 
what it means to say that the five modes conform to a 
system. At PH 2, 48, Sextus refers back to his use of the five 
modes at PH 2, 19-21 as ἐμμέθοδος, which Annas & Barnes 
translate as a ‘methodical procedure’ and means ‘according 
to a rule or system.’27 However, Sextus does not explain what 
exactly he means by that, it could be just a loose reference to 
the use of standardized modes. Thus, even if there is no 
doubt that Sextus uses the five modes together, and 
considers this a methodical procedure, the question is 
whether there is a more specific strategy or rule behind their 
use, and if so, what is the best way to understand its formal 
structure. 
There are, at least, three different scenarios. In the most 
deflationary and economical, we could think that Sextus uses 
the modes one after the other, but without any specific order 
or commitment to use them all or following any rule more 
specific than that. After all, there are multiple passages that 
might suggest this is what is going on. This minimalist 
version could also sound attractive because if there is no 
strategy, the sceptic might think that she can escape from the 
accusation of dogmatism more easily (although, one could 
complain that using the modes randomly is also following a 
rule). 
A second alternative is to think that Sextus has various 
general strategies to apply the modes: sometimes in relation 
to the two modes, others to the ten modes, and sometimes 
using only the five or a subset of the five modes, but without 
following any rule more precise than that. A sceptic may, 
depending on what appears to her at any given moment, 
                                                        
27 See also PH 3, 37; M 8, 337a. 
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combine the different lists of modes tailoring the best 
response in a given dialectical context. Besides, Sextus does 
say that the five modes add variety and possibilities to the 
ten modes and that the sceptic can use them together: 
 
Such are the Five Modes which have been 
handed down by the more recent Sceptics. 
They put them forward not as rejecting the Ten 
Modes but in order to cross-examine the 
rashness of the Dogmatists in a more varied 
way by using both sets together (PH 1, 177). 
 
A third option would be to find a specific strategy that 
explains the way the modes are deployed in a clear rule or set 
of rules. Perhaps there is a single rule that can explain how 
to use the five modes, how to combine them with other 
modes, and why sometimes only some of them are required. 
This view of the system of the five modes seems to be 
assumed by some of the available models described before. 
And even if not all of them make a historical claim, they 
often assume that by systematising the modes in specific 
ways they are offering the most plausible or elegant 
arrangement, doing the sceptic a favour. 
Now, how far does the textual evidence can really take 
us? There are only a few hints in the text that one needs to 
be careful not to overemphasize. For example, it has been 
noted that the order in which the modes are listed may signal 
the standard order of their use (namely, disagreement, 
regress, relativity, hypothesis, and reciprocity; see PH 1, 164, 
170-177 and DL 88.315-318).28 However, in many passages, 
Sextus only uses some of the modes, sometimes in a different 
order or together with other lists. Moreover, he offers no 
                                                        
28 See, for example, Williams (2015, 84). 
   The Systematic Use of the Five Modes…   70 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 42, n. 3, pp. 47-85, Jul-Sep. 2019. 
reason to prefer a certain arrangement to another. Thus, one 
may conclude that the fact that Diogenes’ list has the same 
order as Sextus’, only amounts to the claim that there is a 
standard order for listing the modes, but not necessarily a 
standard way to use them. Another hint that the modes are 
meant to work together in a specific way is Sextus’ account 
of the mode of hypothesis. There, he explicitly says that 
hypothesis is introduced after the regress mode. However, if 
we look at other places, Sextus does not always respect this 
order (see, for instance, PH 1, 185-186; 2, 18-20). 
One thing Sextus does say is that every object of 
investigation can be referred back to the five modes (PH 1, 
169). Perhaps a sceptic does not always need all of them, or 
she can mix and match them with other lists, but the idea is 
that the five are sufficient, even if not all of them are 
necessary all of the time. But yet again, this claim can be read 
in a deflationary way, without implying a specific rule of 
application. It does not even necessarily mean that the 
modes have to be used together, but that all of them are 
general enough as to apply to any possible subject matter. 
The final piece of information is the passages where 
Sextus demonstrates how he uses the five modes together, 
especially where he seems to indicate that there is some logic 
behind determining which mode would be introduced at a 
given moment of the dialectic. But the same passages also 
suggest that the sceptic has a wide range of actions for 
improvisation, adaptation and the use of distinctions or 
concepts that fit the dialectical context or are used by the 
interlocutor (some examples are PH 1, 170-177, 178-179, 
and 185-186). 
Then, one may wonder again, if there really is a way to 
make sense of the textual evidence beyond the deflationary 
reading. In other words, the exegetical challenge is to 
determine whether there is, in fact, a way to unify in a specific 
rule or system all the information we have without 
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compromising the coherence of the sceptical project. I think 
in a way, there is. But is not to be taken as a general 
specification of how sceptics ought to use the five modes. 
Instead, I think it is about how Sextus applies the five modes 
as a sceptical practitioner. Of course, from his use the modes 
in certain patterns, it does not follow any normative 
suggestion. But it is still interesting to see that he tends to 
follow certain more specific patterns without compromising 
his coherence. If we look at the order in which the modes 
are used in the different passages, we can advance in this 
direction. Sextus uses the five modes in the following order: 
 
1. Disagreement, regress, relativity, hypothesis 
and reciprocity (PH 1, 164, 170-177; see also DL 
88.315-318). 
 
2. Disagreement, regress, reciprocity, relativity 
and hypothesis (PH 1, 185-186). 
 
When Sextus uses four of the five modes he does it in the 
following order: 
 
3. Disagreement, reciprocity, hypothesis, regress, 
and then he goes back to reciprocity (PH 2, 18-20).29 
                                                        
29 Finally, we might be tempted to include Sextus’ exposition of the 
two modes at PH 1, 178-179. However, in this passage it is not so 
clear how many modes are being used. A first reading suggests only 
three modes are at play, namely disagreement, then reciprocity or 
regress, and finally, instead of using the hypothetical mode, Sextus 
sends us back to disagreement. Alternatively, one might think that 
he implicitly starts with relativity, which leads to disagreement, and 
that at the end we do have a proper deployment of the hypothetical 
mode and only then we go back to disagreement. Whatever the 
case, the only useful piece of information is that this passage makes 
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Finally, we also know that after regress, the sceptic can use 
the hypothetical mode: 
 
4. […] regress, hypothesis […] (PH 1, 168). 
 
From this, we can observe certain features of Sextus’ use 
of the modes. First, that disagreement is always first. Second, 
that relativity is only followed by hypothesis and is never at 
the beginning or after disagreement, and thus, does not 
trigger the discussion. Third, notice that the other modes 
connect with two others, except for regress that connects 
with three. Disagreement is followed by either regress or 
reciprocity. Regress is followed by relativity, reciprocity, and 
hypothesis. In turn, hypothesis is followed by reciprocity or 
regress. Finally, reciprocity is followed by relativity or 
hypothesis. Moreover, Sextus tells us that all the modes 
could also lead to the suspension of judgement (PH 1, 164-
169 and 186 for the hypothetical mode). Now, it is possible 
to find some specific rules of application derived from 
Sextus use of the modes (which, I want to reiterate, do not 
have normative value but illustrate Sextus’ personal practice). 
 
  
3. A NEW WAY TO UNDERSTAND SEXTUS’ USE OF THE 
FIVE MODES 
 
Despite the variations in Sextus’ use of the modes, the 
information gathered in the previous section can be put in a 
single list of steps. A first version would look like this: 
 
                                                        
explicit that after using the other modes the sceptic can reintroduce 
disagreement. 
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1. Is there a claim? (If there is, go to step 2; otherwise 
go to step 8). 
2. Is there an undecided disagreement over the 
claim? (If so, go to step 7; otherwise go to step 3 or 
6).30 
3. Is there an infinite regress? (If so, go to step 7; 
otherwise go to step 4, 5, or 6). 
4. Is it relative? (If so, go to step 7; otherwise go to 
step 5). 
5.  Has an unjustified hypothesis been proposed? 
(If so, go to step 7; otherwise go to step 3 or 6). 
6. Has a reciprocal justification been offered? (If so, 
go to step 7; otherwise go to step 4 or 5). 
7. Has suspension of judgement been discovered? 
(If so, go to step 8; otherwise go back to step 1). 
8. End. 
 
This sceptical recipe implies that the dialectic can take 
various routes. But it either leads to suspension of judgement 
or loops the conversation going from one mode to the next 
one following the above rules, conveying the recursive aspect 
of the system too. The advantage of thinking about the 
application of the modes in this way is that one does not 
need to hold beliefs to follow these rules. Even a machine 
like an elevator or an automatic door can be programmed to 
do certain actions when they receive the specified input.31 
According to Sextus, the sceptic can act following his 
involuntary appearances with the need for no beliefs (PH 1, 
19-20, 22-23). So the sceptic can follow recipes like this by 
                                                        
30 To decide the disjunctions in this list the sceptic could simply 
choose one of the options based on his appearances at the 
moment.  
31 See, for example, Corti (2009).  
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following what appears to her at the time she asks each 
question. Now, the sceptic, unlike an elevator, may require a 
great amount of preparation, memorization, experience, and 
dialectical talent to follow the above rules. But even if she is 
more like a grandmaster chess player, notice that a machine 
can also achieve this level of expertise by following programs 
and without the need for beliefs. 
In addition, notice that a list of rules does not imply a 
normative principle of rationality. The list does not end up 
recommending or demanding one’s suspension of 
judgement as the expected outcome of a rational 
interchange. In my reconstruction, step 7 only asks for 
confirmation of a psychological fact, the discovery of 
suspension of judgement, of a ‘standstill of the intellect’ (PH 
1, 10). But notice that there are neither demands nor any 
assumption that one has to suspend judgement (suspension 
just ‘comes about’ PH 1, 31). Step 7 only asks us to report 
what appears at a given moment and time (PH 1, 19-20). 
There are no guarantees, nor does suspension follow 
logically, but if it does not happen, Sextus will just go back 
to step 1 and continue the application of the modes. The 
dialectical strength of the system is, instead, that once the 
sceptic initiates the application of the five modes there is no 
easy way out from the loop in which one is immersed. If one 
tries, for example, to ban the sceptic from using the system 
as a valid dialectical strategy at a certain level of conversation, 
the sceptic can use the five modes to challenge those rules of 
interaction, and so on. 
Moreover, the language of discovery is to be understood 
as the finding of appearances, passive and unwilled, that the 
sceptic or her interlocutor will report (PH 1, 22-23). We 
should see these sceptical instructions as a therapeutic 
method against the mental disease of dogmatism (PH 3, 
280). This therapy can be tailored to each individual case and 
is a medicine that might cure the patient but where there are 
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no guarantees that she will be completely cured. However, 
there are testimonies that it sometimes works (PH 1, 26), and 
the sceptic could say that simply by engaging with the 
method one may neutralise some of the symptoms of 
dogmatism, like rashness. As long as one discusses with the 
sceptic, the discussion over a claim stays open. 
Finally, notice that the list can be followed regardless of 
whether one is a perfect sceptic (with no claims to assess), 
an apprentice, or a full-on dogmatist. It can be applied as a 
self-imposed therapy or as a dialectical interchange with 
someone else. 
Now, the list of steps I offered to explain Sextus sceptical 
practice still leaves some questions open: Is there a way to 
specify the alternatives the sceptic should take at each turn? 
Why would some modes only lead to some others and not 
to all of them? 
Consider the mode which comes from relativity. The fact 
that rejecting it always sends us into the hypothetical mode 
might mean that it deals with attempts at grounding claims 
on appearances. One may think that the disagreement over 
a subject is decided by appealing to one’s own 
incontrovertible appearances. An example might help to 
explain what I mean. Someone may agree that there is 
disagreement over God’s existence but reply that it is 
apparent to her that God exists, so the disagreement is 
decidable in favour of God’s existence. A first-person 
testimony of an appearance and the assumption that this 
trumps other people’s opinions and arguments are used as 
grounds for the claim that God exists. A person who 
grounds her judgements on what appears to her is immune 
to disagreement precisely because she gives more credit to 
her personal appearances than to the discussion about the 
topic. Now, Sextus will not fight over appearances but over 
assuming the primacy of the first-person’s report by pointing 
out that one’s appearances are relative. The mode of 
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relativity, then, challenges the unclear jump from appearance 
to judgement. Notice that this interpretation of relativity is 
not superfluous nor can it be subsumed by the mode of 
disagreement. On the contrary, it can tackle responses that 
the sceptic cannot redirect to disagreement. 
Notice, however, that appealing to one’s appearances is 
not a straightforward unjustified hypothesis. Appearances as 
such are clear, so they are outside the scope of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism (see PH 1, 19-20; 2, 8). When someone claims 
something based on appearances and disregarding 
disagreement she might be just a step away from suspending 
judgement because that person could just not realise that 
others might have different appearances (and that this fact 
does not imply they have to change their actions because 
they can just follow their appearances).32 
However, can Sextus use another mode after relativity, 
apart from the hypothetical mode? It does not seem so. The 
justification does not go to an infinite regress because the 
person’s appearance is supposed to be the end of the 
justification chain. If someone asks our theist why it appears 
to her that God exists she might not know, but that would 
be beside the point since what makes the appearance a good 
candidate for grounding one’s claims is its clarity and 
immediacy, not that it is grounded on something else. Since 
the report of an appearance is not another unclear theoretical 
proposition, but the report of a person’s phenomenological 
and psychological state, it is not a case of reciprocity either 
(remember the theists who say ‘God exists because it appears 
so to me, I sense its presence’). All this explains why the 
mode of relativity plays a crucial role in the system and 
cannot simply be regarded as trivial. 
                                                        
32 For the difference between assent and appearances, see Vogt 
(2012). 
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The decisions required after introducing the mode of 
disagreement seem also difficult to explain. If one 
acknowledges that disagreement over a topic is decidable, 
there are two options. Sextus could either introduce the 
mode of reciprocity or the regress mode. But we also know 
that Sextus can also introduce disagreement again. Why he 
does not? The reason might be that Sextus’ interlocutor 
might also disregard disagreement in virtue of a justification 
chain. Surely there is disagreement over climate change or 
whether we should vaccinate children but there are some 
good scientific justifications to believe in both of these 
claims. Here is when the regress and reciprocity mode would 
be introduced instead of applying disagreement again. When 
the sceptic reintroduces disagreement after disagreement, 
she is not using the system, but only one of its modes 
independently. Now, the systematic use of the modes is only 
one way of using them and depending on the details of the 
dialectical interchange (or personal reflections), Sextus might 
decide to interrupt the systematic use to move to a different 
list or to use one of the modes separately. None of this would 
be a problem since Sextus can come back to the systematic 
use at any given time. 
Now, according to our information, rejecting that the 
justification goes on ad infinitum is followed by the modes of 
reciprocity, relativity or hypothesis. The decision as to which 
to select should be clearer by now. Relativity is introduced if 
the end of the justification chain is an appearance. If what 
stops the justification is another claim, there are two options. 
Either what stops the justification is an old claim, as Barnes 
calls them, or a new claim. In the first case, reciprocity is 
introduced, in the latter, hypothesis. 
To dispute the accusation that one’s justification is 
reciprocal, one may reply that we are relying on an 
appearance, to which Sextus will respond by introducing the 
relativity mode. But if one denies that the justification is 
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reciprocal, but it is a claim, then Sextus will introduce 
hypothesis. Finally, if one denies that the last piece of the 
justification is an unjustified hypothesis, Sextus will lead us 
back to regress or reciprocity.  
I can now offer a systematic list of instructions for using 
the five modes based on Sextus practices. Unlike the 
previous list, this version includes information about how to 
choose the next mode at every stage (see figure 3 for a 
graphical representation). The list runs as follows: 
 
1. Is there a claim? If there is go to step 2, if not go to 
step 12. 
2. Is there an undecided disagreement over the 
claim? If it has, go to step 11, or else go to step 3. 
3. Does the claim require a non-reciprocal chain of 
claims? If it does, go to step 4, if not go to step 9. 
4. Is there an infinite regress? If there is, go to step 
11, or else go to step 5. 
5. Is the claim grounded by an appearance? If it is, go 
to step 6, or else go to step 7. 
6. Is it relative? If it is, go to step 11, if not go to step 
8. 
7. Is the claim grounded by a new claim? If it is, go to 
step 8, if not go to step 9. 
8.  Has an unjustified hypothesis been proposed? If 
it has, go to step 11, or else go to step 3. 
9. Has a reciprocal justification been offered? If it 
has, go to step 11, or else go to step 10. 
10. Has the claim been accepted by virtue of a 
concession? If it has, go to step 8, if not go to step 
6. 
11. Has suspension of judgement been discovered? 
If it has, go to step 12, if not go to step 1. 
12. End. 
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Figure 3: new model for the use of the five modes 
 
Like the previous reconstruction, this list offers no 
guarantee that Sextus’ interlocutor will arrive at the 
suspension of judgement. But it shows how the conversation 
will remain in a loop unless someone quits the discussion or 
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discovers suspension. This is not a weakness of the system. 
Sextus never promises a bulletproof therapy that will 
necessarily lead to suspension. One may wonder, however, 
whether staying in the loop count as suspending judgement? 
Perhaps in a sense, it does. Whoever is trapped in the loop 
cannot justify her claims. But sceptical suspension, the one 
that leads to happiness, includes the discovery, the 
realization of this very fact. It is a discovery of one’s own 
cognitive state at the time it is unable to justify a given claim 
and someone could remain in the sceptic’s maze without 
realising this fact. 
To conclude, let me assess my new model with respect to 
my original objectives. My model incorporates the five 
modes, including a non-trivial version of relativity that deals 
with attempts at grounding claims through appearances. I do 
this without falling into the problematic practice of mixing 
Diogenes and Sextus’ report of the modes. More 
importantly, I offer a reconstruction of the modes that 
clarifies the underlying logic of the use of the modes without 
committing Sextus to a normative principle, a rule of 
inference or a claim.33 Finally, my reconstruction of the inner 
                                                        
33 One may worry that by following these instructions, Sextus is 
accepting or denying claims and if that is so, it seems that even if 
he ends up suspending judgement over a topic, he also ends up 
committed to a larger set of claims in the process. If that were true, 
the use of the five modes backfires against the sceptic. At every 
round, the dogmatic or the sceptic using the modes as self-therapy 
will be committed to more and more claims instead of less. But 
since these are steps in a list of instructions, meaning actions to be 
taken, the sceptic can follow her criterion for action, which are her 
appearances here and now (so the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers in the 
representation are a shortcut for ‘it appears so’ and ‘it does not 
appear so’, respectively). So, the sceptic will not gather more 
claims, but will only report his appearances at the time. 
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workings of the system is more firmly grounded on the 
textual evidence of Sextus’ description and application of the 
five modes.  
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